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1 Introduction
This note shows how the threats of exits affect the consequences of collective policy-
making and outcomes in a currency union. In particular, we examine how a member’s
exit influences the possibility of implementing the optimal monetary policy that does
not generate inflation bias.
Our departure point is the canonical model of discretionary monetary policymaking
(Barro and Gordon, 1983a), which is extended to a monetary union scenario with an
exit option. In the initial stage, there are N homogenous members in the monetary
union, each of which will experience heterogeneous within-country output shocks. After
observing the individual shocks, each member chooses whether to remain the currency
union or not. If one leaves the union, it has to pay a fixed cost regarding the exit, but
obtains a domestic currency. On the other hand, the members which chose to remain
collectively select the common monetary policy by majority voting. In this setting,
members that experience extremely high (or low) output shocks have a strong incentive
to exit.
The main findings are as follows. First, the inflation bias arises if more than one
members exits the monetary union. Intuitively, the country that leaves the union
discretionarily chooses its own monetary policy, which hikes the expected inflation and
actual inflation, under rational expectation. Second, to implement the optimal policy
without inflation bias the median voter has to be the one which experiences a positive
output shock. Intuitively, it decreases the equilibrium (expected) inflation, since a
positive shock makes the median voter prefer lower inflation.
This paper is related to the literature on time-inconsistency problems, and collective
policymaking in monetary unions. The seminal work by Kydland and Prescott (1977)
shows the major insights into the time-inconsistency problem: when the government has
the flexibility to alternate the policy, the rational individuals anticipate such behavior
and the outcome becomes worse for both the government and the people. Barro and
Gordon (1983a) point out the time-inconsistency problem induces the inflation bias in
monetary policymaking, and highlighted the benefit of commitment rules rather than
undertaking discretionary policymaking. Since then, a considerable amount of research
has investigated ways to relax the inflationary bias (Barro and Gordon, 1983b; Stokey,
1989; Chari and Kehoe, 1990; Rogoff, 1985; Walsh, 1995; Dal Bo, 2006; Riboni, 2010).
Several papers have studied the collective policymaking in a monetary union. Von Ha-
gen and Süppel (1994) studied collective monetary policymaking under different insti-
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tutional frameworks without exit options. Farvaque and Matsueda (2009) investigated
the sustainability of a monetary union on external shocks. Saito (2018) studied the
optimal design of a monetary union where the monetary policy is determined by Nash
bargaining, and finds that the more bargaining power that the richer country has re-
duced the inflation bias.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our economy.
Section 3 describes the implications of the currency union without an exit option.
Section 4 studies the model with exit option and discusses the main result. Section 5
concludes the article.
2 Setting
We extend Barro and Gordon (1983a) to a currency union setting. In the beginning,
the currency union consists of N identical member countries. An arbitrary country i
has the following identical loss function:
Li =
b
2
(yi − k)2 + 1
2
π2i
where yi is the output, πi is the inflation, and k > 0 is the target level of output. The
output yi follows the Lucas supply function:
yi = a (πi − πe) + ǫi (1)
where πe is the expected inflation, and ǫi is the i.i.d. country-specific supply shock
with mean zero and variance σ2. For simplicity, we suppose that the shocks are not
correlated, offset each other in aggregate, i.e.
∑
i ǫi = 0, and all states are equally
likely, i.e. Prob(ǫi) =
1
N
for all i. The private sector rationally forms its expectation:
πe = E[π].
Before studying the collective policymaking case, let us quickly review the cases of
a single country setting, and if a monetary union with a social planner. If a country has
own currency and discretionary chooses its monetary policy, as per Barro and Gordon
(1983a), it holds that
πi = ab
(
k − ǫi
1 + a2b
)
, yi =
ǫi
1 + a2b
.
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Instead, let us suppose there is a utilitarian social planner with social loss L :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 Li. By plugging πi = πunion ∀i and 1 into L, we obtain that:
L = b
2
[
(πunion − πe − k)2 + σ2
]
+
π2union
2
. (2)
Then the discretionary solution is given by:
πunion = abk, Yunion = 0,
where Yunion is the aggregate output in the monetary union, i.e. Yunion :=
∑N
i=1 yi.
Instead, the commitment solution leads to:
π∗union = 0, Y
∗
union = 0.
Hence the commitment keeps inflation lower while realizing the same output. Notice
that this commitment strategy is time-inconsistent: the policymaker has an incentive
to deviate from the rule when the public sector believes it.
3 Currency Union Without Exit Option
Now we move onto the collective policymaking in the currency union. As a benchmark,
this section considers the case where the members cannot exit the monetary union. The
timing of events is specified as follows:
Stage 0. The private sector forms its expectation.
Stage 1. The stochastic output shocks are realized.
Stage 2. The inflation πunion is chosen.
We assume that at Stage 2 the inflation is determined by majority voting among all
members. We solve the problem by backward induction.
At stage 2, an arbitrary member i has the following loss function:
Li =
b
2
(a (πunion − πe) + ǫi − k)2 + 1
2
π2union (3)
Since Li is single-peaked in πunion, we could apply the median voter theorem: the
member whose optimal inflation corresponds to the median of the bliss inflation of all
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the members is implemented in the equilibrium. Hence the inflation in the union is
given as:
πunion =
ab (aπe + k − ǫm)
1 + a2b
(4)
where ǫm is the median of the output shocks.
By imposing the rational expectation to Eq. 4, we obtain:
πunion = ab (k − ǫm) . (5)
Notice that sgn(πunion) = sgn(k − ǫm). Next we investigate the committee structure
which eliminates the inflation bias. Eq. 5 immediately leads to the following results:
Result 1. The optimal outcome can be achieved if and only if ǫm = k.
Remember that k > 0, implying that the median voter has to be the one who
experiences a positive output shock. The intuition is similar to Rogoff’s (1985) study,
which suggests that the delegation of a conservative central banker reduces the inflation
bias. Since a country’s bliss inflation is a decreasing function of the output shock, the
positive shock makes the country prefer lower inflation. Note that the value of ǫm can
be manipulated by the committee designer. For instance, a rule that gives more voting
power on the high output members might induce higher ǫm than the “one person one
vote” rule.
The next section allows each member’s exit and investigates its effect on the out-
come.
4 Exit and Inflation Bias
Suppose each member has an option to exit the monetary union. The timing of events
is now given as follows.
Stage 0. The private sector forms its expectation
Stage 1. The stochastic output shocks are realized
Stage 2. Each member i exits the monetary union by paying a fixed cost δ > 0.
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Stage 3. The inflation in the monetary union, πunion, is decided by majority vot-
ing amongst the remaining members. Each exited country chooses its domestic
inflation by itself, if any.
Again, we solve the model by backward induction.
We first consider the policy choice at stage 3. Consider an arbitrary member i which
left the union. Its social loss, Louti , is given by:
Louti =
b
2
(
a
(
πouti − πe
)
+ ǫi − k
)2
+
1
2
(
πouti
)2
+ δ (6)
The first-order condition can be arranged to:
πouti =
ab (aπe + k − ǫi)
1 + a2b
. (7)
On contrast, the inflation in the currency union is given by:
πunion =
ab (aπe + k − ǫm)
1 + a2b
(8)
Notice that ǫm could be different from that in the previous section, if some members
exited the union.
At stage 2, each country remains in the union if and only if it decreases the social
loss: Louti ≥ Lunioni . The next proposition characterizes the thresholds of shocks that
the members decide whether to remain in the union or not.
Proposition 1. An arbitrary member i remains in the monetary union if and only if
ǫi ∈ [ǫ, ǫ] where ǫ := ǫm −
√
2(1+a2b)δ
ab , ǫ := ǫm +
√
2(1+a2b)δ
ab .
Proof. Appendix
The result implies that a country would exit if its output is extremely high (or
low) compared to the median of it. A higher ǫm increases both of ǫ and ǫ; hence the
remaining members prefer lower inflation on average. Additionally, an increase in the
cost of exit δ upper-shifts the function Louti − Lunioni ; thus it makes more members to
remain in the union.
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Figure 1: The welfare gain by remaining the union: Louti − Lunioni
Note: Parameters of Figure (a) : a = 1, b = 1, ǫm = 0; Parameters of Figure (b): a = 1,
b = 1, δ = 0.1.
Now, let us consider the private sector’s rational expectation formation at stage 0.
Proposition 2. Under the rational expectation, it holds that:
E[πi] = ab [k − (pǫm + (1− p)E [ǫi|ǫi /∈ [ǫ, ǫ]])] , (9)
πunion = ab
[
k − (1 + a
2bp)ǫm + a
2b ((1− p)E [ǫi|ǫi /∈ [ǫ, ǫ]])
1 + a2b
]
, (10)
where p is the probability that a member will choose to remain in the monetary union.
Proof. Appendix
We now turn to the committee design which aims to reduce the inflationary bias
caused by the existence of k. Proposition 3 leads to the following result:
Corollary 1. The optimal monetary policy is implemented if and only if the following
two conditions are satisfied:
(i) ǫm = k,
(ii) p = 1.
Proof. Appendix
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The first condition is same as Result 1 while the second one ensures none of the
members exits the union. The finding can be interpreted as follows:
Result 2. If more than one member exits, the inflation bias arises.
Hence the currency union has to be designed to prevent the exits in order to com-
pletely eliminate the inflation bias. How can we prevent the members’ exit? One way
is a higher cost of exit δ. This also could be interpreted as an increased gain from
remaining in the union, i.e. low transaction cost, or a gain from the free trade, which
can be at least partially designed. In addition, a smaller variance σ2, which makes the
countries more identical, could prevent the exit. Intuitively, the variance might be small
if the countries with similar characteristics joined the monetary union in the first place.
By explicitly considering the entering phase in the model, we might able to discuss this
issue more.
5 Conclusion
Although threats of exits have been a huge political issue in the European Union, not
much has been studied about the resulting effect on policymaking. In terms of mone-
tary policymaking, exit from the monetary union grants the country its own monetary
authority. By building a simple model, this paper showed that a member’s exit elim-
inates the possibility of implementing the optimal monetary policy, which would be
another new negative effect caused by exits.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
By substituting (7) into (6), we obtain:
Louti =
b (aπe + k − ǫi)2
2(1 + a2b)
+ δ (11)
By plugging (4) into (3) , we obtain:
Lunioni =
b
2
[
ǫ2i − 2
(
aπe + k + a2bǫm
1 + a2b
)
ǫi +
(aπe + k)2 + a2bǫ2m
1 + a2b
]
. (12)
From (11) and (12), we obtain Louti − Lunioni =
a2b2[−ǫ2i+2ǫmǫi−ǫ2m]
2(1+a2b)
+ δ. The result follows by
solving Louti − Lunioni ≥ 0 for ǫi.
Proof of Proposition 2
By taking the expectation of πi, we obtain that
E[πi] = pπ
union + (1− p)E[πouti |ǫi /∈ [ǫ, ǫ]] (13)
By substituting (4) and (7) in (13) , we have that:
E[πi] =
ab [aπe + k − (pǫm + (1− p)E [ǫi|ǫi /∈ [ǫ, ǫ]])]
1 + a2b
. (14)
By imposing πe = E[πi] to (14), we obtain the desired result. 
Proof of Corollary 1.
We need to show: πunion ∧ E[πi] = 0 ∀i⇐⇒ p = 1 ∧ ǫm = k.
Step 1. πunion = 0 & E[πi] = 0 ∀i =⇒ p = 1 & ǫm = k .
Given Eqs.(9) and (10), by supposing πunion = 0 & E[πi] = 0 ∀i and obtain that:
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
 k −
(1+a2bp)ǫm+a2b((1−p)E[ǫi|ǫi /∈[ǫ,ǫ]])
1+a2b
= 0
k − (pǫm + (1− p)E [ǫi|ǫi /∈ [ǫ, ǫ]]) = 0.
(15)
By solving the simultaneous equations (15), we obtain ǫm = k. Substitute ǫm = k
into the second equation in (15) and obtain that:
(1− p)

 k︸︷︷︸
>0
−E [ǫi|ǫi /∈ [ǫ, ǫ]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
= 0. (16)
Notice that ǫm = k > 0 implies E [ǫi|ǫi /∈ [ǫ, ǫ]] < 0, by Proposition 1. Hence Eq.(16)
hold if and only if p = 1.
Step 2. πunion = 0 & E[πi] = 0 ∀i ⇐= p = 1 & ǫm = k .
The result immediately follows by substituting (p = 1 & ǫm = k) into Eqs.(9)-(10).

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